WASHINGTON—The Advanced Warning and Response Network Alliance has told the FCC that Silicondust’s suggestion to disable ATSC 3.0 content security before and during the Nov. 17 nationwide Emergency Alert System test “is inappropriate” and would create “artificial test conditions.”
In an Oct. 26 letter to the agency, Silicondust accused broadcasters of preventing some ATSC 3.0 (NextGen TV) viewers—specifically owners of its HDHomeRun and HDHomeRun Flex set-top boxes—from receiving the EAS test transmission. At issue is the inability of the HDHomeRun products to decode ATSC 3.0 Security Authority (A3SA) protected content.
In a Nov. 1 ex parte filing, however, AWARN Alliance Executive Director Dave Arland told the Federal Communications Commission the test should go forward as planned to “ensure that signals are properly transmitted and then received and decoded for devices designed to work with protected broadcasts.”
Disabling content protection will only prove “that a few thousand set-top receivers are not properly equipped” to receive and make use of all ATSC 3.0 capabilities, Arland said, including “decoding content protection that was designed from the beginning as a key feature of the standard to protect broadcast signals from illicit distribution.”
The alliance reminded the agency that 18 million 3.0 TV receivers and set-top boxes verified for content security can potentially receive and decode the EAS test.
“The AWARN Alliance expects that EAS signaling will be properly broadcast in both ATSC 1.0 and ATSC 3.0 transmissions, with easy reception by ATSC 1.0 televisions and set-top receivers and by NextGen TV-certified and A3SA-security verified consumer receivers,” it said.
Disabling A3SA encryption for the test would “obscure” the performance of EAS under normal operating conditions and interfere with typical broadcast operations, it said.
In its Oct. 26 letter to the FCC, Silicondust asserted that 3.0’s content protection creates a “private access barrier.” The alliance countered, saying protected 3.0 content is no different than protected broadcasts distributed via cable, satellite and telco.
“Obviously, Silicondust devices that cannot decode a protected ATSC 3.0 signal will receive and display nothing for viewers (whom, we would underscore, won’t even be watching the protected channels, anyway, during the National EAS Test or afterwards),” the alliance said.
Disabling 3.0 content protection would place an economic and operational burden on broadcasters and offer no lasting public safety benefits, it said.
Silicondust has not shown that broadcasters are failing to meet their EAS obligations, AWARN concluded, adding, “One receiver’s inability to decode protected ATSC 3.0 programming does not, by itself, establish a failure to transmit a required emergency message.”
“The rules do not require broadcasters to modify otherwise lawful transmission configurations to accommodate receivers unable to decode protected services,” it said.
