WASHINGTON, D.C.—Faced with a looming July 13 deadline for cutting off analog signals on low-power TV stations, the FCC has granted the state of Alaska a delay until January 10, 2022 to cut off analog signals and complete the upgrade to digital for 15 LPTV/ translator stations. 

In its request for a waiver to the July deadline, the state of Alaska noted that it has owned a network of analog TV translator stations located in rural and in Alaska Native communities since the late 1970s. 

This system, which is now called the Alaska Rural Communications System (ARCS), provides free, over-the-air television and radio programming with essential news, weather, emergency alerts and other services to those communities. 

Many of those sites in the network have been upgraded but the work on 15 was not completed due to a variety of construction delays. The remote location of some of these sites, difficult weather conditions that limit work to only a few months each year and the pandemic helped produce the delays, Alaska told the FCC 

“We find that a grant of [the state of Alaska’s] request for a limited waiver...is justified due to a novel set of facts and circumstances that have prevented [Alaska] from completing the digital transition for these operational analog Stations and given the remote Alaskan communities for which these Stations are the sole source of video programming,” the FCC ruled. 

The FCC also ruled that “we find that there will be little if any impact or burden on other television broadcasters or the overall LPTV digital transition by allowing a very small number of rural Alaskan LPTV/translator stations to continue to operate in analog for a limited period of time.” 

It did require, however, that “the State of Alaska shall submit a progress report detailing the status of the digital construction for the stations.”

No one pushed the wrong button. That is the official assessment from the broadcast co-chair of the Alaska State Emergency Communications Committee regarding the false tsunami EAS alert that was broadcast over the air and to cable systems on May 11.

In a statement sent to the Alaska Broadcast Association and shared with Radio World, Broadcast Co-Chair Dennis Bookey said that on the morning of May 11, Alaska broadcast stations and cable systems carried one (and in some cases two) tsunami warnings that were actually a test — not a real alert — sent by the National Tsunami Warning Center in Palmer, Alaska.

[Read: Another False EAS Alert, This One Ringing Out In Alaska]

Specifically, the Alaska EAS system uses a commercial vendor to supply an additional relay primarily for tsunami and AMBER EAS activations. This system, the Emergency Management Network (EMnet), is an internet and satellite-based system capable of distributing both EAS and CAP messages that is managed by the vendor Comlabs. The network delivers messages to the state’s series of 22 LP-1 stations, the Alaska Rural Communications Service, Alaska Public Radio News and other key input points across the state. EMnet in turn is hooked up to the National Weather Service Weather Wire, which carries all warnings and has to filter out the test.

On the morning of May 11, Bookey said, some coding contained within the vendor’s weather processing server failed to recognize the tsunami warning as a test.

“This allowed the test to pass through to the LP-1s and be carried over the air and daisy-chained to all the stations and systems monitoring their LP-1s in the warned areas,” he said. Parts of the Alaska EAS system for tsunami warnings are automated because lives are at stake and in the case of a real tsunami, every second counts, Bookey added.

Bookey said that the issue has since been rectified.

Bookey also clarified to broadcast association members that no one received a WEA alert on their phone. The NOAA Weather Radio did not send out an alert. No tsunami sirens went off and no evacuations were started, Bookey said.

In response to the false alert, Bookey said the website tsunami.gov posted a large green banner clarifying that no warnings were in effect.

“Fortunately, with this happening on a weekday and during morning drive, broadcasters were quickly able to get the false alert information to the airwaves,” Bookey said.

But Bookey clarified that none of these mitigating factors take away from the hit that EAS has again taken to its credibility.

“Some stations had to field a tremendous amount of phone calls on the false alert. Those of us that work hard to make Alaska’s EAS warning system as reliable and credible as possible are more than sorry to see that happen,” he said. “All I can tell you is that we will continue to work as hard as possible to improve the system with the resources and format architecture given to us.”

In Alaska as elsewhere, the EAS system uses three-letter activation codes for each kind of alert while other tests — namely the monthly test, weekly test and national periodic test — all have special independent codes.

On May 11, the Tsunami Warning Center sent out a TSW code — the same as a real activation — but included a test identifier elsewhere in the message that has to be read by software. “So in reality, the message says it’s the real thing and a test,” he said.

But this doesn’t take the equipment provider working with EMnet off the hook, he said. “It never should have happened. But the fact that it keeps happening … suggests … that the format of the internal testing system for tsunamis [needs] a second look.”

Several other false tsunami alerts have happened since the beginning of 2018, including one in Texas and another in New York.

In January, Alaska’s director of Homeland Security and Emergency Management told the Anchorage Daily News that Alaska’s EAS system would not be as vulnerable to a false ballistic missile alarm, such as the one that occurred on January 13 in Hawaii.

 “We don’t have a simple button that you would hit, and it could be the wrong button,” Mike Sutton, the state’s director, told the newspaper. “We have to manually create the message, type in a password, click multiple buttons and then, before you transmit, the system is going to ask the operator to type ‘Yes’ before you are allowed to actually proceed.”  

After releasing a report about the January false ballistic missile alert in Hawaii, the Federal Communications Commission hosted a public roundtable in May to discuss lessons learned. Individuals from various emergency communications organizations participated.

Among them was Dennis Bookey, broadcast co-chair of the Alaska State Emergency Communications Committee, which recently talked with TV Technology sister publication Radio World about its own recent experience with a false alarm.

Radio World:What specifically was the focus of discussion?

Dennis Bookey: I was told Alaska was chosen to be included in the roundtable because it was a good example of what strong working relationships between public safety and broadcasters should look like. As planning advanced, my role was to contribute to the broadcast end of the system. My contribution was going to be on the reporting of false alerts to the FCC and if that should happen.

Our position on notifying the FCC of false alerts is supportive, provided [such a system] in no way burdens any broadcaster and the goal is sharing information to benefit all EAS participants.

We want the FCC to understand that public safety officials and the SECCs have a great deal of parties to answer to right after such an event, and that the call or report to Washington isn’t at the top of the list. But just in the same way we learn from “best practices,” let’s learn from the things that go wrong.

Radio World: What are the emergency issues that your state has had to address within its EAS State Plan that are unique to Alaska?

Bookey: It’s all about tsunamis. We have an occasional AMBER Alert and some local weather alerts the same as any other state, but our focus at the state level is all about tsunamis. It isn’t just a code listed in the plan. There are detailed explanations and diagrams for how that part of the system works.

We’re in an extremely active seismic region of the world. The National Tsunami Warning System is located just outside of Anchorage. The major cause of death from the ’64 earthquake was from the tsunami that followed.

Radio World: Did you learn anything in the discussions that might be useful to implement for Alaska?

Bookey: Yes. After Hawaii and our own recent false alert, I think it’s good that we have a part of our plan that addresses false alerts.

I don’t believe that necessarily means another EAS automatically goes out. Interrupting broadcasters’ airtime needs to be part of the evaluation. That should be [decided on] a case-by-case basis; but the plan should have the procedure documented and who is involved. We had actually started discussion of that process in our first meeting after the Hawaii FCC report came out.

Radio World:Alaska had its own false EAS alert recently surrounding a tsunami warning. There’s been some discussion that the problem lay with the message that was sent from a vendor in Florida to the state’s emergency communications network. Can you shed additional light on what happened?

Bookey: No one pushed the wrong button. On the morning of May 11, Alaska broadcast stations and cable systems carried one, and in some cases two, tsunami warnings that were actually a test sent by the National Tsunami Warning Center in Palmer, Alaska.

So what happened? Because lives are at stake and every second counts, parts of the Alaska EAS system for tsunami warnings are automated. The Alaska EAS system uses a commercial vendor to supply an additional relay primarily for tsunami and AMBER EAS activations. This system, EMNet, is hooked up to our 22 LP-1 stations, ARCS, APRN and some other key input points across the state. EMNet in turn is hooked up to the National Weather Service Weather Wire, which carries all the warnings and has to filter out the test.

In short, there was some coding contained within the vendor’s weather processing server that failed to recognize the tsunami warning as a test. This allowed the test to pass through to the LP-1s and be carried over the air and daisy-chained to all the stations and systems monitoring their LP-1s in the warned areas. This issue has been rectified.

Radio World:What has your organization learned that you might apply for future tests and alerts?

Bookey: The test that took place happens on a regular basis and is not intended for the EAS system. It’s for the NWS and many of the other components of a tsunami warning outside of the EAS environment. We did learn that our EMNet Relay system can successfully send out a tsunami alert and warn the proper areas as a backup to NOAA weather radio. This reinforces the importance of the system in Alaska’s EAS plan. As stated before, we need to formalize the action steps in the case of a false alert.

We’ve learned a great deal from our most recent actual activation in January that has given us a wealth of information. All of the EAS partners involved in the tsunami warning took away lessons that are effecting changes. We learned how important it is to have multiple streams to broadcast and cable operators of the tsunami activation. NOAA weather radio is great. But it’s not enough. Weather alerts aren’t passed through IPAWS. So you need additional sources.

[Read: Another False EAS Alert, This One Ringing Out In Alaska]

Our EMNet relay system takes on a more critical role as a redundancy. In addition we need to do a more detailed job of setting monitoring points especially with our coastal stations. We’ve also learned the timelines for wireless carrier’s plans for bringing WEA online, which we didn’t know prior to the event. Because WEA testing hasn’t officially been authorized yet, our activation revealed varying results with message distribution. We all need to learn where and on what devices a WEA alert is going to show up.

The public is hungry for this feedback; and we have limited information to give them at this point. WEA testing is critical. We hope to include WEA testing in our annual live code tsunami test next March.

Radio World: Why are roundtables like this important?

Bookey: There are different approaches to EAS across the country. It’s always beneficial when you’re exposed to different procedures, and it’s reassuring when you hear from areas that match your experiences.

In broadcasting we’re all pretty well connected, and keep track of what everybody in our industry is doing; but our public safety exposure is most likely limited to those in our locality and state. I greatly appreciated hearing from the public safety officials involved in emergency planning on the panel, as they work well outside of our day-to-day world.

And let’s admit it. Those are the guys activating our transmitters. Hearing frank conversation from Patrick Sheehan of the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency was very enlightening. He was honest enough to admit what we already know: The system is imperfect and it involves humans and humans makes mistakes. There will be other false alerts.

Radio World: What else should we know?

Bookey: We’re all stuck with the technical restrictions of the EAS format. We have to find ways to make it work as best we can. This is one of the areas we rightfully take credit for serving the public good. I hear the line “EAS is broke” quite often. If you think EAS is broke, then get involved and make it better where you live.

ANCHORAGE, AK—Another emergency warning misstep seems to have occurred — this time in Alaska — when the National Tsunami Warning Center issued a supposedly routine communications test at 7 a.m. on Friday, May 11, that was interpreted as a real warning.

A truncated version of a routine tsunami test message was issued by the center, and then “broadcast as an erroneous warning over the Emergency Alert System in Alaska,” the agency said. According to the Anchorage Daily News, those watching TV or listening to the radio at 7 a.m. heard what seemed to be a tsunami warning for areas all along the West Coast of North America and Hawaii.

Although there was a short mention of a test message at the very end of the automated warning, the message seemed to be legitimate warning for coastal counties on the West Coast of North America, according to reporter Zaz Hollander with the Daily News.

Alaska resident Travis Neff told the Daily News that a warning broke in while he was driving to work and listening to an interview about North Korea on NPR.

“At that very moment the alert system began,” he told the newspaper in an email. “I was dumbfounded. It was such a macabre timing, so I was poised waiting to hear that it was 'just a test' and that never occurred.”

The message apparently did not reach the public in Oregon, Washington, California or British Columbia, and was received only by individuals in Alaska, the paper said. The test message did not go out to the public via any communication channels operated by the National Weather Service, nor were messages sent out over the Wireless Emergency Alert system to cellphones. No sirens sounded in tsunami-vulnerable towns like Seward or Kodiak and no message was transmitted over NOAA Weather Radio.

Chris Popham with the National Tsunami Warning Center told the newspaper that phones were ringing off the hook in the two hours after the alert went out. According to Popham, an oceanographer with the agency, those calls were the catalyst that let officials at the center know there was a problem.

“Nothing different happened in this office,” he told the paper. “We sent out the same test message we’ve sent for decades: ‘This is a communications test.’ We saturate it with ‘test.’ How that got interpreted as any sort of warning or advisory, I can’t say.”

At noon on Friday May 11, the National Weather Service released a statement saying that no tsunami warnings have been issued for Alaska. “There is no tsunami threat,” the statement said.

Agencies involved are investigating what happened.

A state emergency spokesman told the Daily News that the tsunami center coded the message properly as a monthly test and that the problem appeared to start with the state’s emergency communications network, EMnet, operated by Florida-based vendor ComLabs.

But Jeremy Zidek, spokesman for the state Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, told the newspaper that an investigation was too preliminary to determine whether the problem was the coding, the network, or something that occurred at the interface of the two. The state is working to determine what happened, Hollander reported.

The situation is reminiscent of the false missile warning that occurred in Hawaii in January.

[Read: Human Error, Poor Safeguards Contribute To False Missile Alarm, FCC Finds]

Mike Chmielewski, chief operating officer for nonprofit Radio Free Palmer, told the paper that he called the nearby tsunami center after the message sounded and determined for himself that there was no tsunami. He then got on the air and reported to the public that there was no tsunami threat.

A notable downside to all this: Listeners may be compelled to dismiss future warnings, Chmielewski told the paper.

“The danger, of course, is the system is designed to alert people,” he said. “If there are too many false alerts …”

The National Tsunami Warning Center said it is looking into why the test message was distributed over the EAS system as a warning and will provide more information as it becomes available.